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Reputation-based Cooperative Detection Model of Selfish Nodes in
Cluster-Based QoS-OLSR Protocol
Nadia Moati
ABSTRACT 
The QOLSR is a multimedia protocol that was designed on top of the optimized link state 
routing protocol for mobile ad hoc network. It considers the quality of service (QoS) of 
nodes in the network when selecting the multi-point relay (MPRs) nodes. This proto-col 
suffer major drawbacks regarding network lifetime, where nodes with high bandwidth but 
limited energy can be selected to serve as MPRs. This would drain the nodes resid-ual 
energy and shorten the network lifetime, and increase selfish nodes that degrade the 
network lifetime. The limited energy and resources, and the absence of any moti-vation 
mechanism cause mobile nodes to act selfishly when selecting the MPRs. In this thesis, 
we consider the tradeoff between prolonging the ad hoc network lifetime and QoS 
assurance based on QOLSR routing protocol. This can be attained by (1) decreasing the 
Multi-Point Relay (MPR) nodes without sacrificing the QoS and (2) taking into considera-
tion the residual energy level, connectivity index, and bandwidth of these relay nodes. The 
mentioned goals can be attained by implementing the clustering model to QOLSR. There-
fore, we suggest a new clustering algorithm and a MPR node selection based on different 
combinations of metrics, such as connectivity, residual energy, and bandwidth. Moreover, 
we consider the selfishness during the election and selection process by proposing the use 
of reputation system that will motivate nodes to participate during the selection of MPRs, 
where the reputation is calculated based on VCG mechanism design. After solving the 
selfishness during network formation, we have discovered that nodes can misbehave after 
being selected/elected. Such a passive malicious behavior could lead to a denial of ser-
vice attack due to the drop of packets. As a solution, we propose a hierarchal cooperative 
watchdog detection model for the cluster-based QOLSR, where nodes cooperate in a hi-
erarchical manner to detect selfish n odes. Furthermore, to motivate watchdogs to monitor 
and cooperate with each other, incentives are given and calculated using cooperative game 
theory, where Shapley value is used to compute the contribution of each watchdog on the 
final decision. Simulation results show that the novel cluster-based QoS-OLSR model can 
well extend the network lifetime, ensure QoS and decrease delay. Adding reputation as 
one of the QoS metrics, motivates nodes to act normally without sacrificing the quality of 
service of the network. In addition, the hierarchical cooperative detection model shows a 
more reliable and efficient detection of selfish nodes.
Keywords: Quality of Service (QoS), Head Election, MPR Selection, Ad Hoc Net-
works, Reputation, Watchdog.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations & Problem Statement
Mobile Ad hoc Networks have been widely used in many operations where non-infrastructure
networks are needed such as in the military. Moreover, MANETs are essential in cases
where the usual wired networks are congested or destroyed. Also, MANETs have a com-
mercial use where they deploy telecommunication and internet services in remote areas.
Unlike the wired networks, mobile adhoc networks imposes a variety of challenges in secu-
rity design because of its dynamic network topology, resources constraints, shared wireless
medium, and open network architecture. The Optimized Link State Routing protocol [44]
is a proactive routing protocol aimed to be implemented over mobile ad hoc networks. It
depends on a group of special nodes to distribute the network topology information and
to pass traffic to their destination. The special nodes are called MultiPoint Relay (MPR)
nodes.
Based on OLSR protocol, Quality of Service (QoS) OLSR protocol, known as QOLSR
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[16], was proposed in literature to consider nodes available bandwidth during the selection
of MPR nodes and routing paths. It was designed to handle multimedia applications over
ad hoc networks. The bandwidth and delay metrics that are needed to ensure QoS are used
during the MPR selection. Therefore, a clustering model is designed to solve the main
limitation of QOLSR protocol. It can eventually threaten the ultimate goal of prolonging
network life time. It selects a large number of MPR nodes because each node independently
selects its group of MPR nodes. Such a problem can affect nodes available bandwidth and
increase the risk of channel collision, especially in compact networks [8].
Moreover, the cluster-based QOLSR protocol has two limitations. First, QOLSR lacks
a motivation mechanism that encourages mobile nodes to be elected as cluster head (CH)
nodes or selected as MPR nodes to interconnect the network clusters. This will lead to
selfishness behavior during the selection process by refusing to be elected as head or MPR
nodes. Also, a security solution should be built to ensure protection without sacrificing in
network performance.
The other limitation arises after network formation where nodes behave normally dur-
ing the election/selection process yet deviate and act selfishly afterward. Nodes may refuse
to be active in packet forwarding causing denials of service. A selfish node tends to avoid
participating in the routing and the packet forwarding processes to save its own energy and
be able to process its own packets without latency. Such a passive malicious behavior will
impede the network services and would eventually cause a denial of service.
In the context of the QOLSR protocol and its derivatives, a node may act selfishly and
refuse to reveal its true QoS parameters. Such a node may exclude itself from the election
process of the CH nodes or selection process of the MPR nodes. However, a selfish node
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may also decide to cooperate during the MPR selection/election, but refuse to cooperate
later on in the packet forwarding process. Thus, the behavior of a selfish node, in QOLSR,
can be described as follows [40]:
1. Refuse to participate in the MPR election/selection process and thus reveal fake in-
formation.
2. Behave normally during the election/selection process and deviate after by dropping
the forwarded packets.
Network performance may be harshly damaged due to selfish nodes and leads to a
partitioned network.
Figure 1: Ad hoc Network With Selfish Node
Consider the example presented in Fig. 1. Assume that N2, which has accepted to be
a cluster head, is a selfish node and N8 in Cluster A needs to send a data packet to N3 in
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Cluster B. If N2 in Cluster A acts selfishly and does not forward any data message, the
network would quickly become unreliable and disconnected.
1.2 Objectives
The main goal of the thesis is to build a Secure QoS-based clustering model for Mobile Ad-
hoc QOLSR networks to prolong network lifetime, to prevent and to detect selfish nodes,
while maintaining the Quality of Service. A detection model is built based on the concept
of watchdogs to reduce the false alarms of selfish nodes. In summary, the objectives of our
thesis are the following:
• Prolong MANET lifetime, ensure QoS and decrease delay.
• Motivate nodes to behave normally without degrading the quality of service of the
network.
• Build a more trustworthy and efficient hierarchical cooperative detection model to
detect selfish nodes.
1.3 Approach Overview and Contributions
This thesis, we first present a clustered QoS-based model for Mobile Ad-hoc QOLSR net-
work as a solution for prolonging the network lifetime by reducing the percentage of MPRs.
Therefore, clusters are formed and then MPRs are selected according to their private infor-
mation such as residual energy and connectivity index to connect these clusters. Note that
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all the proposed models assume the presence of clustering models that can cluster the net-
work, then the MPRs are selected. While in our model, the heads are selected cooperatively
and then the heads will select the MPRs that can connect the heads with each other (1-hop,
2-hop and 3-hop away). Based on the clustering concept, we propose a solution that has
four different clustering models based on three metrics: bandwidth, connectivity index and
residual energy. In summary, our first contribution, is a novel cluster-based QoS-OLSR ap-
proach that is able to (1)Prolong the network lifetime by reducing the percentage of MPR
nodes which in time diminish the traffic over-head and channel collisions(2)collectively
select the group of MPRs based on nodes QoS metric.
Then, we addressed the selfishness behavior during the selection process by refusing to
be elected as head or MPR nodes. Hence, when a node is elected as a CH node or selected
as an MPR node, it should receive a payment from the other electing or selecting nodes.
This reward should be in the form of reputation. Such a reputation system could be based
on the incentive-compatible VCG-mechanism. Since network services would be delivered
in priority to trustable nodes, network nodes should be motivated to play the role of CH
or MPR nodes and see their reputation increasing accordingly. Thus, adding reputation to
the already existing selection process metrics, connectivity, residual energy and bandwidth,
will help in selecting more trusted nodes. The contributions of the thesis can be summarized
as follows:
1. Build a novel cluster-based QoS-OLSR approach.
2. Motivate nodes to behave normally during the election/selection process by giving
incentives in the form of reputation based on the VCG mechanism.
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3. Select the most trusted MPR nodes without sacrificing in network lifetime and in-
creasing delay by considering nodes reputation.
4. Detect cooperatively selfish nodes after the election/selection process based on the
Hierarchical Cooperative Watchdog model, which decreases false positive and nega-
tive alarms and increases the detection.
5. Motivate nodes to act as a watchdog nodes by rewarding them according to their
contribution value in the final detection.
6. Analyze the impact of having less number of watchdogs on the final decision.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows; Chapter 2 provides an overview about
MANETs, Network security, Security in MANETs, cooperative game theory, and shapely
value. Then, we present the related research in the domain of clustering, routing, and secu-
rity in mobile ad hoc networks.
Chapter 3 presents a new clustering model that gives incentives for nodes to be elected
as MPR nodes. We give an illustrative example to present our model. Finally, we simulated
our results to show the efficiency of our model.
Chapter 4 proposes a hierarchical watchdog detection model to detect selfish behavior
after selection of MPR nodes. Thereafter, we proved the efficiency of our models using a
formal mathematical analysis and simulations.
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Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing its contribution, announcing the future
work, and listing the publications obtained from this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background & Related Work
2.1 Introduction
We present in this chapter an overview about the concepts that form our models. Our
clustering model is built over a MANET. Therefore, we present a brief description about
MANETs. Then, we provide an overview about network security and what makes security
in MANETs a challenge. A summary of the security models that are already implemented
in MANETs and their weakness are presented. A definition of game theory and shapley
value was presented since they were used to regulate the cooperation in MANET and to
have a trustworthy selfish detection model.
2.2 MANET Networks
A MANET is a type of network where mobile nodes can change location and configure
themselves for intercommunication with other mobile nodes to form a network. Therefore,
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mobile nodes have double roles in the network; routers or hosts. MANETs have been
used in many operations where non-infrastructure networks are needed such as military.
Moreover, they are essential in cases where the usual wired networks are congested or
destroyed. Also, MANETs have a commercial use where they deploy telecommunication
and internet services in remote areas. To connect them in different geographical areas a
wired infrastructure-based network can be used.
The difference between traditional network and MANET is that decision-making, rout-
ing, key-distribution, and forwarding packets are decentralized and depend on a cooperative
decision between all mobile nodes.
2.3 MANET Clustering Models
2.3.1 QOLSR
OLSR [6] is a classical link state protocol that has been designed based on the requirements
of ad hoc networks. The main idea of this protocol is a set of selected nodes, Multi-Point
Relay (MPR) nodes, that uses their Topology Control messages to distribute the network
topology information and to pass traffic to their destination. The objective of this method
is to reduce remarkably the overhead of the control messages. Therefore, the protocol is
mainly appropriate for large and dense networks. Unfortunately, OLSR cannot guarantee
or ensure QoS since it was not designed for multimedia purposes. To cope with this lim-
itation, QOLSR [2] routing protocol was developed based on OLSR where QoS has been
considered. This raises the need for new metrics such as bandwidth and delay. Thus, the
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aim is to find a source-destination routes, but the optimal ones that satisfies the end-to-end
QoS requirements. The selection of MPRs are based on the QoS measurements that allow
QOLSR to find optimal paths. Multiple-metric routing criteria were considered in order to
improve the QoS of the route. The QOLSR has main limitation. MPRs are selected based
on nodes bandwidth without considering nodes energy level and connectivity which can
shorten the network lifetime.
2.3.2 Connectivity-based and Energy-based Clustering Models
Research provides many approaches for clustering ad hoc networks where they are all based
on dividing the network into clusters then choosing the head nodes. The first approach is the
HOLSR protocol [28]. This protocol is based on a two hierarchy of nodes. The first level
is an interconnected mesh of head nodes that act as mobile access points because they have
higher communication capabilities. The other nodes form the clusters by connecting to
cluster head nodes. All traffic is routed through a cluster head node. The second approach
is the OLSR Tree protocol [12]. The network is divided into trees where a leaf chooses its
parent with the maximum connectivity. A cluster is a tree with the cluster head being its
root. To interconnect the roots, a set of MPR nodes are determined based on an extended
version of OLSR. The last approach addresses huge ad hoc networks [27]. This approach
is based on broadcasting TC messages by cluster heads; thus any source node can define
its route towards the destination. This approach presents a simpler solution than the OLSR.
Moreover, many approaches were presented to increase network lifetime by considering
nodes residual energy as a metric for the routing protocol. Also, connectivity [39] can
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be added as a metric when choosing MPR nodes. To choose routes with highest energy,
some approaches (e.g., [3] and [45]) assign high costs to links with minimum energy, and
then chooses routes with minimum cost using Dijkstras algorithm. Other criterion can be
defined such as choosing the link that minimize the maximum one node spent energy is
preferred [13]. All presented clustering approaches choose the clusters and then cluster
head nodes are selected.
2.4 Network Security in MANET
Security has become an essential issue for ensuring secure and protected communication
between mobile nodes. In general, network security involves policies applied by a network
administrator to prevent and monitor misuse, modification, unauthorized access, or denial
of network node or resources. Network security ensures secure communication among
business, agencies and individuals.
Unlike the wired networks, MANETs impose a variety of challenges in security design
because of its dynamic network topology, resources constraints, shared wireless medium,
and open network architecture. Therefore, a security solution should be built to ensure
protection without sacrificing in network performance.
The open wireless architecture in MANET makes the wireless channel accessible by
both legitimate users and malicious attackers. Therefore, there is no clear line of defense
when designing security in MANETs. Moreover, limited resources in MANET is another
challenge when designing security. Mobile nodes have limited bandwidth and limited en-
ergy. Also, the dynamic nature of MANETs where nodes frequently enter and leave the
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network imposes higher risk of vulnerability. MANETs are subject to passive and active
attacks.
One type of passive malicious behavior in MANETs is selfish nodes. Selfish nodes
in MANETs will be addressed in this thesis. The literature provides several protection
mechanisms against selfish nodes. These mechanisms can be divided into two categories:
incentive-based strategies fostering cooperation among selfish nodes and detection-based
strategies. Incentive strategies motivate nodes of the network to participate in the path
discovery and packet forwarding. If these incentives are not enough, detection strategies
can be used. If a node is not rational and acts selfishly, mechanism should be used to detect
this behavior, and eventually punish the node to avoid its negative impact on the network.
To implement the above strategies, two different types of mechanisms have been proposed.
In credit-based mechanisms, a node should retribute beforehand any other node providing
some network services. Such a mechanism should incite a node which would eventually
need some services from others to participate in the collective effort. Reputation-based
mechanisms are similar to the credit-based mechanisms. Instead of earning some credits,
cooperative nodes would gain some reputation. Since network services would be offered
in priority to trustworthy nodes, rational nodes should participate in the collective effort.
2.4.1 Credit-Based Mechanism
Credit-based mechanisms reward nodes that forward packets and offer general network ser-
vices to others. Such cooperative nodes earn credits. Since a node will not be able to send
its own packets if it does not own credits, these mechanisms should incite rational nodes to
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participate to the collaborative efforts. Sprite is a credit-based mechanism [42] that encour-
ages selfish nodes to participate in the general network services. It is an incentive-based
strategy in which a node sends to a central Credit Clearance Service (CCS) the receipts of
the messages that it has received/forwarded. These receipts are only sent when a node can
communicate efficiently with the clearance service. Any node involved in the transmission
of a message would be able to show its participation with these receipts. The CCS acts as
a virtual bank and determines how much any given node would earn or would pay for any
given forwarded message. In any credit-based mechanism, it is important to secure credit
values. Misbehaving nodes may try to forge receipts to earn credits or may try to freely
send their own messages without reporting them. Sprite proposed using game-theoretic
approaches to design a secure solution for initiating selfish nodes to participate in the col-
laborative effort.
2.4.2 Reputation-Based Mechanism
In ad hoc networks, reputation is used to indicate the behavior of the nodes in the network.
By direct or indirect observations of a nodes behavior, a node can form an opinion about any
other node in the network. This corresponds to the reputation of the node for the observing
node. To build its opinion, a node can observe the behavior of the nodes in a given path, the
number of retransmissions or acknowledgement messages, and whether a neighbor node
retransmits all its packets as expected. In this context, Watchdog and Pathrater [40] propose
to detect non cooperating (selfish) nodes. A watchdog is implemented on each node in
the network to observe messages sent by neighbor nodes. By comparing the overheard
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messages and the messages that the node forwards, the watchdog can identify selfish nodes.
The weakness of the watchdog is that it can not detect selfish nodes in the following cases:
ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, limited transmission power, false misbehavior
and partial dropping.
CORE is a collaborative reputation mechanism [21] that also has a watchdog com-
ponent. This reputation system differentiates between three different types of reputation:
subjective reputation (observations), functional reputation (task specific behavior), and in-
direct reputation (positive reports by other nodes). These reputations are weighted to give
a combined reputation that is used to assess any given node. Unfortunately, CORE allows
second-hand information permitting cooperative misbehaving nodes to increase each others
reputation. Thus, CORE is vulnerable to fake positive ratings.
CONFIDANT protocol [38] also uses reputation to detect selfish nodes. CONFIDANT
has four components: monitor, reputation manager, path rater and trust manager. These
components do the critical functions of neighborhood watching, node rating, path rating
and sending/receiving alarm messages respectively. When a suspicious event is detected
while a node is observing its 1-hop neighbors, the monitoring node sends details about
this event to the centralized reputation manager. This component updates the rating of the
misbehaving node after identifying the significance of the event. When the bad rating of
a node becomes greater than a tolerable threshold, a message is sent to the path manager
which controls the route cache. At last, the trust manager sends a warning alarm message
to other nodes. The main weakness of CONFIDANT is its complexity, due to the need of
extra components and sending extra messages. Moreover, the reliability of the alarms is
not guaranteed.
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SORI [36] is a mechanism used to detect selfish nodes. The trust of the node is based
on a local evaluation (first hand trust). In other words, a node personally evaluates its
neighbor nodes, and also uses the second hand trust evaluation from other nodes. Based on
these trust evaluation, actions are taken against selfish nodes.
Cooperative on demand secure routing (COSR) protocol [15] is designed on top of the
DSR routing protocol. It uses reputation system to detect misbehaving nodes and increase
the cooperation between nodes. Contribution of nodes, capability of forwarding packets
and recommendation are the parameters that are used to measure the node and route repu-
tation. The contribution refers to the number of routes and data packets forwarded between
nodes. Capability of forwarding packets refers to the ability to send packets of a certain
node using energy and bandwidth threshold [15]. Recommendation is other nodesâA˘Z´
subjective recommendation.
COSR has proven well with selfishnodes, wormhole, blackhole and rushing attack but
not in DOS attack. Above models have high false detection of selfish nodes because they
are vulnerable to collision attacks. Whereas, The proposed model is built over QOLSR
protocol, where selfish nodes are detected cooperatively to decrease the false detection.
Moreover, RPASRP [17] is a privacy-aware secure routing protocol based on multi-
level security mechanism to provide support for privacy protection and protect against
internal attacks in WMNs. It depends on the mix usage of dynamic reputation mecha-
nism built by Merkle Tree technology, role based multi-level security technology, subject
logic and uncertainty, and hierarchical key management protocol. RPASRP protect against
specific internal attacks initiated by compromised mesh routers and provide authenticity,
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integrity and secrecy of routing packets. This model showed that it is secure, privacy pre-
serving and efficient. It showed a high packet delivery ratio and shorter average route
length with respect to other models. Also, an integrated system was conducted based on
the reputation and price-based systems [46] that overcome the drawbacks of the reputa-
tion system and price-based system, which are the two major approaches that deal with the
cooperation problems in MANET. This system showed the effectiveness in terms of coop-
eration incentives. This integrated system was based on leveraging the advantages of both
systems. Analysis showed that the integrated system provided higher performance than the
other two systems regarding detection of selfish nodes and cooperation incentives.
Despite the advantages of the above detection schemes, these mechanism lack effi-
ciency in terms of ambiguous collision, false alarms and detection, non-cooperative deci-
sion unlike the security model proposed in this thesis.
2.5 Cooperative Game Theory and shapley value
Game theory is a study of strategic decision making used when an action of a component
depends on the others [23]. This theory is used to reach an optimal decision. For example,
a company can not take a decision of reducing its products prices without taking into con-
sideration other companies actions. These companies are the players in this game. Without
considering all players decision, the company might be taking a wrong decision that will
make the company lose. Game theory is extensively used in the domain of computer sci-
ence, biology, economy and military. This game is built of seven main components; infor-
mation, players, strategies, actions, outcomes, payoff, and equilibrium. The players are the
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components that make decisions. The actions are a group of decisions of which the players
have to choose. The information is the learning of the player while taking the decision.
The principles that control the decision making of the player are the information and the
desired decision is the outcome. Shapley value is used in Game theory to represent the
marginal contribution of each player in the game according to a uniform distribution over
the set of all permutation on the set of players. Shapley value can provide one answer to the
following questions; how much important is each player with respect to other cooperating
players in the game?what gain that each player expects? Formally, shapley value is defined
in equation1.
φi(v) =
1
N
∑
R
v(PRi ∪ i)− v(PRi ) (1)
Function v is the value function which is the worth of a certain coalition of players in S.
In other words, it represents the anticipated sum of payoffs the players in S can have when
cooperating. The sum is over all N in the order R of the players and PRi is the players in N
which come before i in the order R.
As an example, consider a coalition game with three players N = 1,2,3 of which 1 and
2 have two right hand gloves whereas 3 has a left hand glove. The game is to form a pairs.
The function v is given in equation 2.
v(S) =

1 if S ∈ {1,3},{2,3},{1,2,3}
0 otherwise
(2)
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To calculate the marginal contribution of player 1, we refer to equation1. Table1 repre-
sents the marginal contribution of player 1 in all orderings.
Table 1: Marginal Contribution of Player 1
Order R Marginal Contribution of Player 1
1, 2, 3 v(1)− v(φ) = 0− 0 = 0
1, 3, 2 v(1)− v(φ) = 0− 0 = 0
2, 1, 3 v(1, 2)− v(2) = 0− 0 = 0
2, 3, 1 v(1, 2, 3)− v(2, 3) = 1− 1 = 0
3, 1, 2 v(1, 3)− v(3) = 1− 0 = 1
3, 2, 1 v(1, 2, 3− v(2, 3) = 1− 1 = 0
Therefore, φ1(v) = (1)16 =
1
6
. By symmetry, φ2(v) = φ1(v) = 16 . Since the sum of of
all shapley values is 1, φ3(v) = 23 .
This is widely applied to get the expected value of contribution of a player in a game.
2.6 Conclusion
We presented in this chapter the concept of MANETs, security in MANETs and its chal-
lenges. Also, we explained game theory and shapely value that were used in this thesis to
ensure efficient cooperation between nodes. We presented in this chapter the related works
in the fields of clustering and security in mobile ad hoc networks. The existing clustering
algorithms lack the ability of selecting and maintaining the best paths with respect to QoS,
delay, and overhead. Regarding the misbehaving mobile nodes, the existing approaches
have high rate of false detection of selfish nodes.
18
Chapter 3
Reputation-Based Model in
Cluster-based QoS-OLSR Protocol
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present the new metric functions of our proposed models. These func-
tions are based on the available bandwidth, connectivity index, residual energy and repu-
tation of the nodes. Adding reputation as a parameter of the QoS metric functions should
increase trust in the network without sacrificing quality of service. These functions are used
by the cluster head nodes election algorithm which elects a group of cluster heads. These
elected CH nodes then select a group of the MPR nodes which assure that the network is
connected [18].
Section 3.2 describes the clustering algorithms used and the novel model based on
the Clustered-based QoS-OLSR Network. Then, Section 4.4 presents empirical results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 The Quality of Service Metric Models
In this section, we present the clustering algorithms of our model that are based on the
Quality of Service metric function bandwidth, connectivity index, and residual energy.
Implementing these concepts will help us to prolong network lifetime without sacrificing
QoS. Our clustering algorithm can be briefed with two steps. First, the cluster head election
algorithm elects a set of optimal cluster heads. Second, the elected cluster heads will
select the set of optimal MPR nodes that can lead to a connected network. To have better
performance and quality of service, we introduce the cluster-based QoS-OLSR approach.
Based on the clustering concept, we propose a solution that has four different clustering
models based on three metrics: bandwidth, connectivity index and residual energy.
To rely on nodes which are more trustworthy, while keeping the same performance and
quality of service, we propose to include the nodes reputation as a parameter of the QoS
metric functions. These functions are used to elect the CH nodes and select the MPR nodes
interconnecting the CH nodes. In Table 1, the QoS metric functions of the four QOLSR
models are defined.
These metric models can be used to define eight different protocols:
• Classical QOLSR with RB-OLSR model (or RPB-OLSR, RBE-OLSR, RPBE-OLSR)
• Cluster-based QOLSR with RB-OLSR model (or RPB-OLSR, RBE-OLSR, RPBE-
OLSR)
In the former case, the QOLSR protocol [16] is extended and uses the defined QoS
metric models to select the MPR nodes. In the latter case, each node first elects its most
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Algorithm 1: Quality of Service Metric Models
Let i be a node in the network. Let define;
QoS(i) = Its quality of service metric
BW (i) = Its available bandwidth
N(i) = Its number of neighbors
RE(i) = Its residual energy
R(i) = Reputation of i
1 Reputation Bandwidth - OLSR Model (RB-OLSR)
QoS(i) = BW (i) + R(i)∑
R(i)
;
2 Reputation Proportional Bandwidth OLSR Model (RPB-OLSR);
QoS(i) = BW (i)
N(i)
+ R(i)∑
R(i)
;
3 Reputation Bandwidth & Energy OLSR Model (RBE-OLSR);
QoS(i) = BW (i)×RE(i) + R(i)∑
R(i)
;
4 Reputation Proportional Bandwidth & Energy OLSR Model (RPBE-OLSR);
QoS(i) = BW (i)×RE(i)
N(i)
+ R(i)∑
R(i)
;
trustworthy neighbor as its local CH node based on its QoS metric. Once all the CH nodes
have been identified, these nodes use the defined QoS metric models to select the MPR
nodes interconnecting them.
3.2.1 Reputation-Cluster-based QoS-OLSR Approach
The Cluster Head Election
To elect the set of optimal cluster head nodes and partition the network into clusters, an
election algorithm is modeled, where each node votes for its neighbor node that has the
maximum value of Quality of Service Metric. In case the node has the maximum value,
then it can vote for itself. This solution presents a one-hop clustering model because every
node is one-hop away from its elected cluster head. The elected cluster heads would act as
MPR nodes for their electors after the election algorithm is finished. Some modifications
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Cluster Head Election Algorithm
Let i be a node in the network.
1 Let k ∈ N1(i) ∪ {i} be s.t.
QoS(k) = max{QoS(j)|j ∈ N1(i) ∪ {i}}.
2 The node i votes for k.
3 MPRSet(i) = {k}.
have to be done:
1. Flag a node to show that it has been assigned as a cluster head.
2. Flag a neighbor that has been elected as a cluster head.
For each of its neighbors, a node shows for which node its given neighbor has voted
for. Before the nodes can update their local information, the results of the election have to
be broadcasted to them.
The MPR Nodes Selection
Once the cluster heads have been designated, they are responsible to select a group of
optimal MPR nodes. This group of nodes links the clusters into a connected graph, if one
exists. Note that the 1-hop cluster heads can be directly reached and therefore there is no
MPR - Part I: Computing the neighbor clusters
Let k be any elected cluster head.
1 the 1-hop cluster heads as
CH1(k) = {i ∈ N1(k)|i has its CH flag set}.
2 the 2-hop cluster heads as
CH2(k) = {i ∈ N2(k)|i has its CH flag set}.
3 the 3-hop cluster heads as
CH3(k) = {j|(∃i ∈ N2(k))[i voted for j]} \N1,2(k).
4 the set of cluster heads to be covered as
CH(k) = CH3(k) ∪
CH2(k) \ {j|(∃i ∈ CH1(k))[j ∈ N1(i)]}.
need to select MPRs in between. Moreover, the 2-hop cluster heads connected to 1-hop
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cluster heads do not have to select any MPR to connect them. Therefore, the main problem
is to reliably cover the 3-hop cluster heads. In MPR-Part II, the algorithm computes the
MPR nodes to cover the 2-hop cluster heads.
MPR - Part II: MPR nodes for the nodes in CH2(k)
Let k be any elected cluster head.
5 While CH(k) 6= ∅
6 Find l ∈ CH(k) ∩ CH2(k) s.t.
7 The path (k, x, l) maximizes QoS(x) among all paths
connecting k to any other uncovered node.
8 MPRSet(k) = MPRSet(k) ∪ {x}.
9 Remove from CH(k) all the nodes in CH2(k)
reachable from x.
Finally, the 3-hop cluster heads are selected in MPR-Part III. In such a case, To reach
any 3-hop cluster head, two MPR nodes are needed.
MPR - Part III: MPR nodes for the nodes in CH3(k)
Let k be any elected cluster head.
10 While QoS(k) ∩ CH3(k) 6= ∅
11 Find l ∈ QoS(k) ∩ CH3(k) s.t.
12 The path (k, x, y, l) maximizes min(QoS(x), QoS(y)) among
all paths connecting k to any other uncovered node.
13 If there are two such paths, take the first one
in the lexicographic order.
14 MPRSet(k) = MPRSet(k) ∪ {x}.
15 Remove from CH(k) all the nodes in CH3(k)
reachable from x.
The correctness of this part has to be proven formally. If the cluster head k selects the
MPR node x, the cluster head l has to select the MPR node y to assure that k and l are
connected.
It is very crucial for each cluster head to have more than one choice to connect to its
neighbor cluster heads.
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Illustrative Example
To clarify the election and selection of cluster head and MPR, respectively, Figure 2 presents
a network with twenty nodes and Table 2 provides the Quality of Service Metric values of
each node in this network using the Proportional BE-OLSR Model (refer to Table 1). To
find the Quality of Service metric of each node in the network, the residual energy which is
a random value between 500 and 550 (refer to Table 2) is divided by the connectivity index
and multiplied by bandwidth.
Each node votes for its maximal Quality of Service metric value neighbor node, after
receiving the Hello messages from it. Using the Cluster Head Election Algorithm, nodes:
3, 4, 5, and 15 are elected as head clusters (MPRs).
Figure 2: Ad hoc Network example
Once the cluster heads are elected, they select the MPR nodes that connect all cluster
heads together. We will consider node 15 in cluster D to illustrate our example. First,
is to find the neighbor cluster heads for node 15. Referring to MPR-Part I, we need to
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Table 2: Quality of Service QoS Metric using the Reputation Proportional BE-OLSR Model
Node n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 n10
QoS Metric 370.85 297.35 500.25 479.45 516.75 338.75 231.15 220.45 490.65 246.45
Node n11 n12 n13 n14 n15 n16 n17 n18 n19 n20
QoS Metric 250.65 193.15 127.25 159.95 600.95 109.95 101.55 495.35 400.55 550.75
find the 1-hop cluster head, CH1, the 2 − hop cluster head, CH2, and the 3-hop cluster
head, CH3. So, CH1(15)=φ since there is no 1 − hop cluster head connected to node 15.
CH2(15) = 5 since node 5 is a 2-hop cluster head to node 15, and similarly forCH3(15)=3
and CH3(15)=4.
The second step is to find the optimal path that will connect the 2-hop cluster heads that
are node 15 and node 5. Node 8 and node 16 are common neighbors for these 2 head nodes,
but according to MPR-Part II Algorithm, node 8 is chosen as the MPR node since it has a
better QoS metric value than node 16. Now, we need to find the optimal path for the 3-hop
cluster heads referring to MPR-Part III. There are two choices to connect head node 15
with head node 3, either through {node 11, node 19} or {node 17, node 19}. Head node 15
chooses the path {node 11, node 19} which has the maximal QoS metric value. However,
head node 15 would select only node 11 as an MPR node and, symmetrically, head node 3
would select node 19 as an MPR node. Similarly, the optimal path with {nodes 8 and 3} to
reach cluster head node 4 is found.
The Reputation Payment
A node will gain reputation when elected as a CH node or selected as a MPR node. Hence,
a node j should pay to an elected/selected node i some P (j) in the form of reputation if
node i accepted to play its role. Cluster Head Payment algorithm represents the payment
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mechanism to a CH node where each elector will pay using the incentive compatible mech-
anism VCG where truth telling is the dominant strategy. Such a payment does not depend
on what nodes reveal. But it depends on the second best choice, where the payment is the
difference between the QoS of the elected node (CH/MPR) and the second best QoS node
in their neighborhood.
Algorithm 2: Cluster Head Payment algorithm
Let i be an elected CH node.;
1 for ∀j ∈ N1(i) ∪ {i} do
2 P (j) = QoS(i)−max{QoS(k)|k ∈ N1(j) ∪ {j}\{i}};
3 R(i) = R(i) + P (j);
The electing nodes send their payments using their Electing message (a specialized
Hello message). Once a CH node has received its payment, it should rebroadcast them in
its Hello messages. Thus, any electing node can check whether or not a CH node follows
the protocol honestly. For more details, refer to the RBC-OLSR protocol [24].
Then, a pair of CH nodes which are two-hop away will have to pay the selected MPR
node. This is shown in the Two-hop away MPR Payment algorithm.
Algorithm 3: Two-hop away MPR Payment algorithm
Let k and l be two CH nodes that are two-hop away.;
Let i be the MPR node connecting k and l s.t. min(QoS(i)) is maximized among all
paths.;
1 P (k) = QoS(i)−max{QoS(j)|j ∈ N1(k)
⋂
N1(l)\{i}}
2 P (l) = QoS(i)−max{QoS(j)|j ∈ N1(k)
⋂
N1(l)\{i}}
3 R(i) = R(i) + P (k) + P (l);
The pair of CH nodes which are three-hop away will have to pay its selected neighbor
serving as MPR node. This is shown in the Three-hop away MPR Payment algorithm.
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Algorithm 4: Three-hop away MPR Payment algorithm
Let k and l be two nodes that are three-hop away.;
Let i and j be two MPR nodes connecting k and l s.t. min(QoS(i), QoS(j)) is
maximized among all paths.;
Let i∗ and j∗ be two nodes connecting k and l s.t. min(QoS(i∗), QoS(j∗)) is
maximized among all paths avoiding i and j.;
1 P (k) = min(QoS(i), QoS(j))−min(QoS(i∗), QoS(j∗))
2 R(i) = R(i) + P (k);
3 R(j) = R(j) + P (k);
3.2.2 Illustrative Example
Figure 3: Reputation Mechanism example
To illustrate the payment mechanism, the example presented in Fig. 3 shows a net-
work where the CH and MPR nodes are selected [18] and with arrows representing the
direction of the payments. First, using the Cluster Head Payment algorithm, the CH nodes
{N3, N4, N5, N15} are paid by all their neighbors. For example, the nodes {N2, N10, N14, N18}
will pay the CH node N5. R(N5) will be equal to R(N5) + P (N2) + P (N10) + P (N18) +
P (N14). P (N2) is equal to QoS(N5) − QoS(N3) which is 16.5. Similarly, P (N10) =
QoS(N5) − QoS(N18) = 21.4, P (N18) = QoS(N5) − QoS(N10) = 270.3, P (N14) =
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QoS(N5)−QoS(N18) = 21.4. If the initial reputation R(N5) is 100, its new reputation is
given by 100 + 16.5 + 21.4 + 270.3 + 21.4 = 429.6.
Second, we need to calculate the new reputation of the MPR nodes connecting the 2-
hop away CH nodes using Two-hop away MPR Payment algorithm. Consider the MPR
node N8 to illustrate the mechanism. N8 connects the CH node N15 with the CH node N5
so each CH node should pay N8. Since N16 is a common neighbor between N5 and N15
and the next best candidate nodes (with respect to the QoS metric), R(N8) = R(N8) +
2(QoS(N8)−QoS(N16)).
Finally, we need to calculate the new reputation of the MPR nodes connecting 3-hop
CH nodes using Three-hop away MPR Payment algorithm. Consider the CH node N15 and
the CH node N3, that are connected through N11 and N19. The second best QoS path uses
N8 and N2.
The difference between the two QoS is P (N3) = P (N15) = min(QoS(N11), QoS(N9))−
min(QoS(N8), QoS(N2)) = 30.2. However, the CH node N3 will pay N19 and the CH
nodeN15 will payN11. Then,R(N19) = R(N19)+P (N3) andR(N11) = R(N11)+P (N15).
3.3 Simulation Results
Matlab-8.0 has been used to simulate the Classical QOLSR with B-OLSR, PB-OLSR,
BE-OLSR, PBE-OLSR, and Cluster-based QOLSR with B-OLSR, PB-OLSR, BE-OLSR,
PBE-OLSR, RB-OLSR, RPB-OLSR, RBE-OLSR, RPBE-OLSR models to present the im-
pact of adding the nodes reputation as a parameter of the QoS metric functions on the net-
work performance. Nodes in all networks are considered to be mobile. Random Waypoint
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Mobility Model [43], a very common and widely used mobility model is implemented in
Matlab to simulate our results. This mobility model is a straightforward model that was
used to move nodes in our network. A node moves in a straight line with a constant speed
to a randomly choosen destination node in the network. This recurse at a constant pause
time. The coordinates of the nodes are based on a discrete-time stochastic process where
they are distributed over the network space using a uniform random stochastic model. The
speed, direction and pause time are also defined based on a uniform random distribution
process where they are defined in the parameter table. This model is suitable for low speed
mobility and for open area systems where no barriers are induced [11]. The simulation is
divided into four subsections. The first, second, and third subsection shows the percentage
of selected MPR nodes, number of alive nodes and the path lengths that represent delay,
respectively, in the three scenarios: Classical QOLSR, Cluster-based QOLSR, and Cluster-
based QOLSR with reputation. The fourth subsection presents a table of the average trust
difference. All our simulation results have a 95% confidence level. The upper and lower
bounds are calculated accordingly to make sure that the calculated means of the simulations
are within such interval. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 3.
3.3.1 Percentage of MPR nodes in the Network
In Fig 4, the cluster-based models considerably decrease the number of selected MPR
nodes. These selected MPR nodes contain the cluster heads which act as specialized MPR
nodes. It is obvious that the reputation cluster-based models have approximately the same
percentages of MPR nodes; this means that including reputation as one of the QoS metrics
29
Table 3: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation area 500× 500 m
Number of nodes Between 30 and 70
Transmission range 125 m
Mobility Speed Random value in [1...10] msec
Mobility Direction Random value in [0...pi] m/sec
Pause Time 10 sec
Residual energy Random value in [500..550] Joules
Initial Reputation 100
Packet Size Random value in [0.5..1.5] kb
Energy Per Packet 0.0368 J
Idle Time Random value in [0..1]
Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Available Bandwidth Idle T ime× Link Bandwidth
Run Iterations 100 iterations (95% confidence level)
does not increase the number of selected MPR nodes. Comparing the four models, obvi-
ously in Fig 4, the “with clustering” BE-OLSR model has the minimum percentage of MPR
nodes, since these nodes are selected according to the two parameters that are bandwidth
and energy without being proportional to the number of neighbor nodes.
3.3.2 Network Lifetime
The energy consumption at node i is computed using the following parameters:
• BW (i): Available bandwidth at node i.
• RE(i): Residual energy of node i.
• EN(i): Energy consumed by node i.
• Packet size.
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Figure 4: Percentage of MPR Nodes: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-OLSR (c) BE-OLSR (d) Pro-
portional BE-OLSR
• Energy per Packet.
In Fig 5, we show the percentage of alive nodes and how the energy drains for a 70
node network for all the models. The energy spent by relay nodes is considered where the
Energy Consumption (EN) is calculated using Equation 3. This will be done by finding
the total number of packets the node i will transfer. This value is achieved by dividing the
available bandwidth at node i by the mean packet size 1kb. Then, we have to multiply the
total number of packets transferred by the energy per packet which is 0.0368J according
to the simulation parameters table (refer to equation 3). The residual energy is decreased
by the value of Energy consumption. (refer to equation 4)
EN(i) = (BW (i) / Packet size)× Energy per Packet J (3)
New RE(i) = RE(i) − EN(i) J (4)
As expected, the clustered models "with reputation" and "without reputation" in Fig 5
have the same network lifetime because they have the same number of selected MPRs. It
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Figure 5: Percentage of alive nodes over time: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-OLSR (c) BE-
OLSR (d) Proportional BE-OLSR
is significant that the with clustering proportional B-OLSR (see Fig 5, a) has the worst
network life time among all clustered models, whereas, with clustering BE-OLSR shows
the best results overtime compared to others. The models that depend on the residual energy
prolong the network lifetime because the MPR nodes are chosen based on the residual
energy of nodes. It is clear that the reputation does not affect network life time.
Another aspect to consider, in this analysis, is the end-to-end delay in the network.
Figure 6 represents the source-destination path length of the four different models of the
"reputation with clustering”, "with clustering" and “without clustering” networks. The path
length is presented by the average number of hops between source and destination. The
path with the best Quality of Service metric is selected as the source-destination optimal
path. In each figure, we show a comparison of the average path length for the three models.
The “reputation with Clustering”, "with Clustering" and “without Clustering” Models show
similar results. Thus, including reputation as a QoS metric in the election phase does not
increase the delay in the network.
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Figure 6: Average Path Length: (a) B-OLSR (b) Proportional B-OLSR (c) BE-OLSR (d) Propor-
tional BE-OLSR
3.3.3 Average Trust Difference
Moreover, trust is an essential property of nodes in a mobile ad-hoc networks which leads
to a more reliable and cooperative network. It is essential to measure how much our model
is trustworthy. Therefore, we measured the average difference of reputation which is the
difference between the optimal reputation and the current reputation in the network for all
models having 30, 50, 70 and 100 nodes in the network. The optimal reputation is measured
by choosing the packet forwarding path just according to the best reputation, whereas the
current one is measured based on our models. As the percentage difference decrease, the
model is more trusted. Table 4 represents the percentage average difference for different
number of nodes in the network for the four models that take into consideration reputation
in its QoS metrics. According to this table, the with clustering proportional RB-OLSR has
less than 1% reputation average difference percentage which is the minimal.
In Summary, our clustering approach prolonged network lifetime by decreasing the
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Table 4: Trust Average Difference
Models Number of Nodes in Network
30 50 70 100
with clustering Prop. RBE-OLSR 15.49% 19.7% 24.16% 25.14%
with clustering Prop. RB-OLSR 1.32% 0.65% 0.95% 0.79%
with clustering RBE-OLSR 6.54% 12.95% 26.19% 19.04%
with clustering RB-OLSR 2.43% 4.86% 3.52% 2.9%
number of selected MPR nodes. The clustered-based RBE-OLSR model showed best re-
sults regarding network lifetime. Moreover, results show that adding trust in the form of
reputation did not affect the percentage of MPRs, network lifetime, and delay in the net-
work. Comparing the four models, the most trusted one is the clustered-based RB-OLSR
which show a very low average difference between the optimal reputation and the reputa-
tion in the network. The payment mechanism gives an incentive to the network nodes not
to act selfishly during the electionselection of MPR nodes.
3.4 Conclusion
The shortage of energy and the struggle of recharging in ad hoc networks made selfish
nodes a common problem during and after selection of MPR nodes in a cluster-based
QOLSR network. All experimental results are done on the mobile cluster-based QOLSR
models. We present a novel efficient motivation model that motivates nodes during selec-
tion to behave normally by increasing their reputation then consider it when selecting MPR
nodes. Also, nodes with higher reputation have higher priority in the network to get access
to services. As expected, results show that including reputation as one of the QoS metric
does not affect the performance and Quality of Service QoS of the network, whereas it
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makes the network more reliable and trustworthy.
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Chapter 4
Cooperative Detection Model of Selfish
Nodes
4.1 Introduction
After designing a model that elects trusted CH nodes and selects trusted MPR nodes, we
present in this chapter a mechanism to detect CH or MPR nodes behaving selfishly after
their selection. Unfortunately, a node can refuse to serve other nodes after being elected/se-
lected. Therefore, we propose to use a detection system based on the concept of watchdogs
to monitor the elected/selected nodes. This system is implemented over the cluster-based
QOLSR network in order to detect and catch passive malicious (selfish) nodes. Then, we
present a formal analysis to prove the efficiency of our detection model based on shapley
value.
Section 4.2 presents the detection model based on the Hierarchical Cooperative Watch-
dog. Section 4.3 presents an incentive model and a formal analysis of the detection model.
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Then, Section 4.4 presents empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Detection Model: Hierarchical Cooperative Watchdog
After designing a model that elects trusted CH nodes and selects trusted MPR nodes, we
need to use a mechanism to detect CH or MPR nodes behaving selfishly after their se-
lection. Unfortunately, a node can refuse to serve other nodes after being elected/selected.
Therefore, we propose to use a detection system based on the concept of watchdogs to mon-
itor the elected/selected nodes. This system is implemented over the cluster-based QOLSR
network in order to detect and catch passive malicious (selfish) nodes.
A watchdog is a node that monitors the behavior of CH and MPR nodes [32]. One of
the main problems of the watchdog detection model is the high rate of false positive and
false negative alarms. The former case corresponds to alarms falsely accusing nodes to be
selfish while the latter case corresponds to nodes dropping packets without being detected.
Thus, our main objective is to increase the trustworthiness of the model and decrease the
rate of false alarms. To improve performance, reduce false detection rate, and overcome the
limitations of the watchdog nodes, we reuse the hierarchical structure of the cluster-based
QOLSR network to build our monitoring system.
The hierarchical model has two layers. The nodes that have elected the CH node belong
to the first layer and they are responsible to monitor their corresponding CH node. As
the second layer, the CH nodes that have selected the set of MPR nodes must monitor
them. Hence, the evaluation of a given node as normal or selfish node is based on the
evaluation of all the watchdog nodes monitoring this node. Based on our model, nodes with
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higher reputation has leading impact on the final decision. The Hierarchical Cooperative
Watchdog algorithm presents the detection mechanism.
Algorithm 5: Hierarchical Cooperative Watchdog algorithm
Let w be a watchdog monitoring Ni.;
while a packet p is received do
if Ni is the source or the destination of p then
Simply ignore p.;
else
1 p has to be transmitted by Ni.;
2 Add p to a time-based data structure T .;
if p has been transmitted by Ni then
3 Remove p from T . ;
4 Ni is normal.;
else
if p is still in T after some timer ∆ then
5 Ni is Selfish.;
The watchdog nodes should monitor the intermediate nodes responsible of forwarding
data packets between the source and the destination nodes. A watchdog can monitor any
neighbor node in its transmission range. Thus, an electing node should watch its elected
CH node. Similarly, a CH node should watch its selected MPR node(s). Any watchdog
should maintain a buffer (or any other efficient data structure) to decide whether or not the
supervised node Ni forwards the data packet as supposed. If a packet p stayed in the time-
based data structure T more than a time ∆, thenNi is considered a selfish node. Otherwise,
Ni behaves normally.
The evaluation of a monitored node (either a CH or an MPR node) should be based on
the weighted decisions of all neighbor watchdog nodes. Thus, the decisions of a given
watchdog should be weighted according to its reputation. A more trustable watchdog
should be considered over a less trustable one. Such an evaluation can be achieved by
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the aggregation function given in Eq. 6.
f(wj, Ni) =

1 wj detect Ni as selfish
0 wj detect Ni as normal
(5)
F (Wi, Ni) =
∑
wj∈Wi R(wj)× f(wj, Ni)∑
wj∈Wi R(wj)
(6)
where Wi is the set of nodes monitoring Ni.
If F (i) is greater than a specific threshold, in the example we use it as 0.5, then Ni is
considered a selfish, otherwise it is considered as a normal.
Figure 7: Hierarchical Cooperative Watchdog Mechanism example
Assume node S wants to forward a packet to node D as illustrated in Figure 7. The
39
packet should be forwarded through the path {N5, N8, N15}. These nodes should be mon-
itored by watchdog nodes. In this example, since N5 is a CH node then it should be mon-
itored by its electing nodes {N2, N10, N18, S}; N8 should be monitored by the CH nodes
{N5, N15}; N15 should be monitored by the electing nodes {N8, N9, N11, N16, N20, D}.
We illustrate the monitoring steps of N5. First, N20 should compare the packets sent by N8
to N15 with the packets sent by N15 to node D. Thus, a watchdog N20 should determine
whether N15 forwards packets as expected or whether it acts selfishly and drop them. As-
sume that CH node N15 is a selfish node and that f(N8) = 1, f(N9) = 0, f(N11) = 1,
f(N16) = 1, f(N20) = 1, f(N17) = 0, and R(N8) = 150, R(N9) = 120, R(N11) = 165,
R(N16) = 100, R(N20) = 180, R(N17) = 110, then F (N15) = (1× 150 + 0× 120 + 1×
165 + 1× 100 + 1× 180 + 0× 110)÷ (150 + 120 + 165 + 100 + 180 + 110) = 0.73. Thus,
N15 could be truly detected as selfish node since F (N15) is greater than 0.5. The main issue
here is how to motivate watchdogs to not behave selfishly and cooperate with each other.
4.3 Incentive Model: Contribution of Cooperative Watch-
dogs based on Shapley Value
Watchdog nodes may behave selfishly while detecting selfish nodes and give false alarms,
therefore in this section, we propose an incentive model based on Shapley value to motivate
watchdogs to behave normally and monitor the elected/selected nodes. Also, Shapley can
be used to analyze our proposed hierarchical model where the detection does not require
the detection level of all the watchdogs. Assume that N is the set of nodes in network G,
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each node in G will represent a player in the cooperative n person game where n=N. A
coalition is a set of players cooperating to reach a decision. In our model, the players have
to cooperate to decide if a node is behaving selfishly or normally. In cooperative game
theory, a coalition is defined as:
∆ ⊆ N and ∀x ∈ ∆
f(x) =

1 x detect Ni as selfish
0 x detect Ni as normal
(7)
So, a coalition is the set of watchdog nodes that are voters of Ni in case it is a CH node,
or CH nodes in case Ni is an mpr, where Ni the node that is being monitored. Each player
in the coalition will report if Ni is selfish or not and give the value 1 or 0. We use the
weighted aggregation function 6 over ∆ to decide whether the node should be considered
selfish or normal. Each node in ∆, will have certain value of impact on the final decision.
It is important in our model to show that the incentive is allocated over the nodes in ∆
that influenced the decision. This will motivate nodes to always monitor and not to be
selective while monitoring in order to receive a reward of detection. To be able to find
the impact of each player, we need to calculate the contribution of each node Ni in ∆.
Shapley value [19] will be used to present the marginal contribution of each player in the
cooperative game according to a uniform distribution over the set of all arrangements on
the players.
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First, we find all different subsets for the nodes
∏
∆ in ∆. The contribution of node Ni
will be the average of all the differences between the function including all nodes in the
subset including node Ni and the same function of all nodes but excluding Ni where δ is
the number of subsets.
φNi(∆) =
1
δ
∑
pi∈∏∆
F (PNipi ∪Ni)− F (PNipi ) (8)
Referring to example 7, where the CH node N15 is monitored, Shapley value is uti-
lized to measure the contribution of each potential watchdog nodes. Table 5 represents the
reputation of each watchdog monitoring head N15.
Table 5: Nodes Reputation
Node N8 N9 N11 N16 N17 N20
Reputation 150 120 165 100 110 180
Using equation 8, we calculate the contribution value of each node that will be used to
reward each watchdog.
Table 6: Contribution Value
Node N8 N9 N11 N16 N17 N20
Contribution Value 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.3
It is clear that nodes with higher reputation have higher contribution on deciding whether
a node is selfish or normal. This is one of the advantages of our hierarchical watchdog
model where nodes with low reputation has less impact. This is why we introduced the
idea of having an incentive model that motivates nodes with high reputation to serve as
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monitors and cooperate with others. Therefore, subgroups of the 6 nodes were selected
and their corresponding validation value was calculated using the weighted aggregation
function 6. Table 7 presents the validation values of the different subgroups starting with
all the 6 watchdogs followed by the decision of the set of 5 nodes {N11,N8,N9,N20,N17}
with highest reputation, then, the other set of 4 nodes {N11,N8,N9,N20} with the highest
reputation, and finally, the set of 3 nodes {N8,N11,N20} with highest reputation.
Table 7: NODES Validation Value
Count of Nodes 6 5 4 3
Validation Value 0.73 0.68 0.80 1
The results in Table 7 show that the final trusted decision can be reached by electing
the watchdog nodes that have the highest reputations instead of using all CH voters to be
watchdog nodes, since all the validation values are greater than 0.5. This means that even
with less number of watchdog nodes, head N15 was detected as selfish because including
the reputation is giving higher impact to more trusted nodes on the final detection result.
The watchdog nodes will be motivated by increasing their reputation as shown in Table 9.
The reputation increase will be equal to their contribution to the final detection. In example,
we calculated the contribution value of watchdog nodes in a subset of the first three highest
reputation monitors in Table 8. N20 had reputation = 180 and the contribution = 0.42,
so the new reputation will be 180+0.42×100 = 222. As a result, this analysis show that the
performance of the detection model will be more efficient in terms of resource consumption
since less number of monitoring nodes are needed for a trusted decision. Thus, there is no
need to have all the voters of the head, whereas a subset of the highest reputation nodes
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will be able to detect any selfish activity.
Table 8: Nodes Contribution Value in a Subset of Three Nodes
Node N8 N11 N20
Contribution Value 0.33 0.35 0.42
Table 9: New Reputation Value After Reward
Node N8 N11 N20
Old Reputation 150 165 180
New Reputation After distributing the Rewards 183 200 222
4.4 Simulation Results
Matlab-8.0 has been used to simulate the efficiency of our detection model implemented
over the clustered-based QOLSR networks simulated in chapter 4. The simulation is di-
vided into two subsections. The first subsection shows the effect of selfish nodes on packet
delivery. Second, we present the detection probability of selfish nodes with the existence
of selfish nodes and how false alarms of selfish nodes is affected in our model. All our
simulation results have a 95% confidence level. The upper and lower bounds are calculated
accordingly to make sure that the calculated means of the simulations are within such an
interval. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 3.
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4.4.1 Effect of Selfish Nodes on Packet Delivery
Figure 8 presents the affect of selfish nodes on packet delivery. It is obvious that the packet
delivery percentage drops to more than half in the presence of selfish nodes in the net-
work. As the percentage of selfish nodes increase, the probability for a packet to reach its
destination will decrease because selfish nodes will refuse to forward it.
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Figure 8: Packet Delivery Percentage
4.4.2 Selfish Nodes Detection Probability
Figures 9 and 10 show the efficiency of the two layer hierarchical cooperative watchdog
model in detecting selfish nodes in the network and validate the cooperative game theory
analysis conducted in section 4.2. Figure 9 presents the detection probability of selfish
nodes, i.e.the number of nodes detected as selfish from total number of selfish nodes mon-
itored, taking subsets of 25%, 50%, and 75% from the total watchdogs in layer one, i.e.
the voters of the CH nodes monitoring the CH. The subsets are chosen according to the
monitors with highest reputation. The results validate the analysis by showing that not all
watchdog nodes monitoring at a specific layer are needed to have a reliable selfish nodes
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detection, whereas a subset of high reputation watchdog nodes can give a reliable detec-
tion. Also, Figure 10 validates the formal cooperative game theory analysis because the
false-positive and false-negative detections in our model diminished. This shows that our
model is an accurate and efficient one.
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Figure 10: False Detection Percentage of Selfish Nodes-Cooperative vs. Noncooperative Detection
Model
In Summary, based on the simulations, we show that selfish nodes have a serious nega-
tive effect on packet delivery. As a result, the network becomes unreliable and an efficient
detection model is needed. The detection model that is based on the hierarchical coopera-
tive watchdog concept show good results regarding the detection of selfish nodes. There-
fore, we are able to show that adding reputation to avoid security problems does not have a
negative influence on the QoS of the network, yet it decreased the false detection of selfish
46
nodes by approximately 50% since the watchdog node with the highest reputation has the
highest contribution on the final destination.
4.5 Conclusion
The results show that if 50% of the nodes are selfish, the packet delivery percentage drops
to 10%. All experimental results are done on the mobile cluster-based QOLSR models. We
present a novel efficient detection model that detects nodes behaving selfishly after selec-
tion basing the final decision of the detection on a weighted decision where the most trusted
node has the leading contribution. Incentives are granted to watchdogs based on their fi-
nal contribution and calculated based on Shapley value. The cooperative game analysis of
the proposed watchdog model and simulation results show that not all watchdog nodes are
needed for a truthful detection, only a subset of monitors at each layer having the highest
reputation; thus saving the resources of the network nodes. Also, the novel detection model
is reliable and show approximately 50% drop in the false detection of selfish nodes.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Mobile ad hoc networks are widely used for multimedia application. The main objec-
tive is to provide the best quality of service and a secure communication. Therefore, we
proposed a clustering model that considers the QoS parameters while electing MPRs. Net-
work nodes cooperatively select a set of heads to serve as MPRs. Once the head nodes are
elected and consequently clusters are formed, the elected nodes will cooperatively select
the set of MPRs that can connect these clusters. In literature, clustering in OLSR was ad-
dressed as a solution for prolonging the network lifetime, by reducing the percentage of
MPRs, where clusters are formed and then MPRs are selected according to their private
information such as residual energy or connectivity index (valency) [14, 28]. Note that all
the proposed models assume the presence of clustering models that can cluster the network
and then the MPRs are selected. While in our model, the heads are selected cooperatively
and then the heads will select the MPRs that can connect the heads with each others (1-hop,
2-hop and 3-hop away). This model reduced the number of MPR nodes by 30% which lead
to prolonging the network lifetime. Since, nodes can behave selfishly while electing MPR
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nodes to save their energy, a new model was proposed that considers the nodes reputation
as one of the QoS metrics. This will motivate the nodes to be selected as MPRs. Simulation
results proved that including reputation in the QoS metrics does not affect the quality of
service in the network. Then, a detection model based on watchdog concept was imple-
mented over Mobile QOLSR networks to detect selfish nodes. Simulation results showed a
decrease of 50% in false detection compared to other models. The formal analysis showed
that watchdogs with higher reputation have higher contribution in the detection of selfish
nodes which makes our model very efficient.
In summary, the main contributions of our thesis are:
1. Building a novel cluster-based QoS-OLSR approach.
2. Improving the trustworthiness of the network by selecting the most trusted MPR
nodes.
3. Detecting cooperatively selfish nodes after the election/selection process based on
the Hierarchical Cooperative Watchdog model.
4. Building a more efficient detection model by using less number of watchdog
For further work, we will consider a punishment system that will punish detected selfish
nodes and malicious watchdog nodes that give false detection.
The following is the list of journal articles submissions derived from the thesis work:
• “A Cluster-Based Model for QoS-OLSR Protocol”, to the conference of Wireless
Communications and Mobile Computing , IEEE, 2011
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• “Reputation-Based Cooperative Detection Model of Selfish Nodes in Cluster-based
QoS-OLSR Protocol”, to the journal of Wireless Personal Communications, Springer,
2014
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